A sharp forecast meets an immediate rebuttal

A public dispute over the future of the Epic Games Store has exposed how differently the same business can be read. In an interview published on August 23, Emmanuel Rosier, Newzoo’s director of market intelligence, argued that Epic may no longer have a credible route to reversing its position against Steam. He characterised the store’s free-game strategy as one that can drive claims without necessarily producing lasting play or purchasing behaviour.

Epic responded through Martin Keely, vice president and general manager of the Epic Games Store, saying that its internal performance figures point in the opposite direction. Keely cited 2025 third-party PC game spending of $400 million, up 57% year on year, and 2.78 billion hours spent in third-party games, up 4%. The company says both measures were records.

The exchange became more complicated when Newzoo issued a clarification. It said Rosier’s comments were not supported by Newzoo data or analysis, had not considered relevant public evidence, and should not be regarded as a Newzoo market assessment. That does not invalidate Rosier’s concerns as an individual industry view, but it substantially narrows how his prediction should be interpreted.

The figures support neither simple narrative

Epic’s 2025 annual review presents genuine evidence of progress in parts of the store business. Total PC player spending reached $1.16 billion, an increase of 6% from 2024. The catalogue passed 6,000 titles, while the store reported 317 million or more PC users in total and a record 78 million monthly active users in December.

However, the same report shows why the debate cannot be settled by a headline figure. Overall playtime on the store was 6.65 billion hours, down 14% year on year. Average monthly active users fell 1% to 67 million, while average daily active users fell 2% to 31 million. In other words, Epic reported stronger spending and third-party activity alongside softer overall engagement.

That distinction matters because the Epic Games Store is not measured like a conventional premium-game shop alone. It is connected to Epic’s own games, cross-platform accounts, promotional giveaways, mobile distribution ambitions and alternative payment arrangements. A player may have an Epic account through Fortnite or another partner platform without becoming a frequent store customer, while a commercially important game can use its own payment system and therefore not be fully reflected in the store’s reported transaction totals.

Epic specifically notes that its $400 million third-party PC spending figure excludes some games whose developers process in-game payments independently. It cited major live-service and premium titles as examples. This means the figure is useful for tracking revenue processed through Epic’s systems, but it is not a complete measurement of all commercial activity associated with third-party games on the platform.

A strategy shifting from acquisition to retention

The central criticism of Epic’s earlier approach is not that free games fail to attract users. Epic’s own figures show that they do attract attention: it offered 100 free games in 2025, and players claimed 662 million free titles. The harder question is whether promotional acquisition turns into a durable habit of browsing, buying and playing within the same ecosystem.

That is where store design and launcher quality become strategic rather than cosmetic issues. Epic has said it is rebuilding its launcher to improve performance and is planning storefront changes including better recommendations, faster access to categories and clearer game update information. Keely argued that the upgraded launcher would accelerate the momentum visible in third-party spending.

The timing remains significant. The Epic Games Store launched in late 2018, and many PC players have already built large libraries, social connections and routines elsewhere. A faster launcher or more complete feature set can reduce friction, but it cannot automatically undo the advantage created by years of accumulated purchases and user familiarity. Epic’s challenge is therefore less about persuading players that its store exists than about giving them a recurring reason to begin their purchase journey there.

For developers, Epic still has meaningful leverage. Its standard 88/12 revenue split remains more favourable to publishers than the traditional terms associated with many digital storefronts. Epic also offers programmes under which qualifying developers can keep all net revenue for a defined period, and it permits developers to use their own payment solutions for in-app purchases. Those incentives can be commercially attractive, especially for developers with established audiences or live-service businesses.

Yet developer economics and consumer behaviour do not always move together. A favourable share can encourage a game’s release on a store, but a broad catalogue alone does not guarantee that consumers will make it their default destination. The platform needs dependable discovery, convenience, performance and community features alongside favourable commercial terms.

What recovery should mean

The word “recovery” is itself misleading if it implies that Epic must match Steam on every measure to justify continuing the store. Epic has a wider business built around games, development tools and account infrastructure, so the storefront can create strategic value beyond direct sales commissions. Its data also shows a growing third-party commercial base rather than a platform in obvious retreat.

At the same time, Epic’s numbers do not demonstrate that the storefront has achieved a settled, self-sustaining position. The fall in total playtime and slight declines in average active users contrast with the strong third-party spending growth. Profitability cannot be determined from player-spending figures alone, because the public data does not disclose the store’s operating costs, incentives, payments to partners or its internal allocation of revenue.

The most credible reading is that Epic has moved beyond the claim that its store is simply stagnating, but it has not removed the structural doubts that underpin the criticism. Its next test will be whether the planned launcher improvements and developer incentives translate into higher regular activity, not merely a larger library or occasional promotional traffic.

Rosier’s forecast was too categorical to treat as an institutional Newzoo conclusion, particularly after the firm’s disavowal. Epic’s rebuttal, meanwhile, is supported by real improvements in third-party spending and engagement. The unresolved issue is whether those gains represent the beginning of a lasting consumer shift or an encouraging but still partial advance within a highly entrenched PC games market.

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